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GAME ON: THE EPIC BATTLE BETWEEN
THE FAA AND THE NLRA IN PROFESSIONAL
SPORTS AFTER EPIC SYSTEMS CORP. V.
LEWIS
KURT MCWILLIAMS

INTRODUCTION
Choices which best suit the goals and aspirations of the individual are a
fundamental condition of freedom.1 That includes making promises or
agreements and being bound by them. It naturally follows that parties should
also be free to resolve their contractual disputes by a means of their choosing,
like arbitration. In the employment sector the hurdle to “liberty to contract”
comes from the unequal bargaining power enjoyed by employers versus the
potential employee.
Professional sports are particularly vulnerable to bargaining power disparity
as there is generally one league, per sport, with a fixed number of teams.2 The
number of players that can play in any given season is therefore finite.3 This
supply/demand imbalance gives team owners power when dealing with athletes
and player unions. If the oversupply of talented athletes was not enough, players
have a limited time window in which they can perform at the highest
competitive level. The average NFL career for example is between three to five
 Kurt McWilliams is a cum laude 2020 graduate of South Texas College of Law Houston. Kurt also has
degrees in Polymer Science from the University of Southern Mississippi (B.Sc.) and Organic Chemistry from
Texas A&M University (Ph.D.). Kurt has enjoyed a successful career as an innovator, research scientist, R&D
leader, and Patent Agent. Kurt has initiated and collaborated on projects around the globe including research
programs, business management, market development, and capital expenditures. Kurt looks to
help entrepreneurs and companies manage their technical and IP portfolios and would like to extend this to
individual brand and performance property rights. A truism in golf and life is that "you can't hit them all bad,
keep striving for victory" unless someone invents a golf ball that lowers your handicap by seven shots.
1. CLAUDE D. ROHWER & ANTHONY M. SKROCKI, CONTRACTS IN A NUTSHELL 2 (7th ed. 2010).
2. NBA – 30 teams, NFL – 32 teams, MLB – 30 teams, NHL – 31 teams, WNBA – 12 teams, NWSL – 10
teams.
3. Maximum number of players allowed per league including supplemental or practice squads, NBA – 480
players, NFL – 1,760 players, MLB – 1,200 players, NHL – 731 players, WNBA – 144 players, NWSL – 234
players.
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years.4 Sitting out a single season can reduce the earning potential of an NFL
player by twenty to thirty-three percent. This ticking clock puts the athlete at a
further disadvantage with respect to employment bargaining power.
To restore the balance, employees can band together and collectively
bargain for better wages, benefits, working conditions, etc. Collective
bargaining agreements between player associations and leagues are present in
most professional sports.5 These agreements rely heavily on arbitration6 to
resolve disputes. Collective bargaining7 and arbitration8 are enshrined in law to
encourage parties to aspire to their “better natures” and provide a recourse when
they do not.9 It is the collaboration of these two statutes that has driven labor
law since the 1930’s. The Supreme Court in 1964 stated in Carey that “the
underlying objective of the National Labor Relations [Laws] is to promote
collective bargaining agreements and to help give substance to such agreements
through the arbitration process.” 10
Carey might have signaled the golden age of harmony between the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA)11 and National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).12 The
Supreme Court itself proclaims a duty to “interpret Congress’s statutes as a
harmonious whole rather than at war with one another.”13 Expansion of territory
by the judiciary and administrative agencies made it inevitable that conflict
would arise. This paper will explore the evolution of the FAA and NLRA from
bosom buddies to perpetual combatants and its potential impact on professional
sports. Much like the demise of the Mega-Powers14 in 1989 perhaps the FAA,
a.k.a. Hulk Hogan, and NLRA, a.k.a. Randy “The Macho Man” Savage, were
never meant to be friends.
4. Christina Gough, Average Length of Player Careers in the NFL, STATISTA (Sept. 10, 2019),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/240102/average-player-career-length-inthenationalfootballlength/#league/#:~:text=According%20to%20the%20source%2C%20the,for%20players
%20across%20the%20NFL.
5. Professional Golfers of America Tour, Ladies Professional Golf Association, National Women’s Soccer
League, MMA, Boxing, Professional Wrestling do not operate under collective bargaining agreements.
6. Michael Hayes, 'Hey, We Were Here First!': Union Arbitration and the Federal Arbitration Act, 70
SYRACUSE L. REV. 991 (2020) (citing statistics estimating ninety-nine percent of all major union-employer
collective bargaining agreements resolve disputes with binding arbitration).
7. See Federal Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.S § 157 (2021).
8. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2021).
9. ROBERT A. HEINLEIN, THE NOTEBOOKS OF LAZARUS LONG 64 (1978) (“Never make your appeal to a
man’s better nature; he may not have one”) (ebook).
10. See Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 265, 274 (1964) (Both the majority and dissent
agreed to this sentiment).
11. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2021).
12. See Federal Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.S. § 151 (2021).
13. EPIC Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1619 (2018).
14. The Mega-Powers was a World Wrestling Federation team duo composed of Hulk Hogan and Randy
“Macho Man” Savage. The duo was formed in 1987 and participated in tag team and individual events. As
part of the ongoing performance scripts the partners provided mutual aid and assistance, until ultimately
disbanding in 1989 due to internal jealousy and distrust. See The Mega Powers, Fandom,
https://prowrestling.fandom.com/wiki/The_Mega_Powers (last visited Mar. 27, 2021).
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I. EXPANSION OF FAA TO EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS
The FAA15 was born in 1925 when Congress codified their wish for parties
to resolve commercial differences via arbitration. Congress instructed federal
courts to uphold arbitration clauses as written by the parties, and the decisions
resulting from them.16 The FAA included two key prongs, the first that
arbitration was applicable to commercial transactions defined as interstate
commerce17 and the second that enforcement of arbitration could be voided if
the contract itself was revocable, a “saving clause.”18 The FAA does not cover
“employment contracts”19 for seamen, railroad, or any other class of workers
engaged in interstate commerce.20 However, the application of the FAA to
employment contracts has been with us since 1957 in Lincoln Mills21 and most
recently confirmed in 2018 with EPIC Systems Corporation.22 Over time the
resistance to excluding arbitration from employment contracts has eroded.23 A
case in point is Gilmer.24
II. GILMER
The Gilmer Court concluded that the requirement of arbitration imposed by
a third party was not in violation of the FAA employment agreement
exclusion.25 Arbitration was not part of the employment agreement between the
employee and employer but rather a condition of professional registration with
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). The NYSE bound both parties to
resolve any “dispute, claim or controversy” between them via arbitration.26 The
Court determined that this includes contractual and statutory issues.27 The
15. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2021).
16. See generally id.
17. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2021).
18. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2021).
19. New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 541 (2019) (defining employment contracts as “Congress
used the term ‘contracts of employment’ in a broad sense to capture any contract for the performance
of work by workers”).
20. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §1 (2021) (stating it was due to pressure from labor unions that the
employment contract exception was included. Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Ala.,
353 U.S. 448, 467-468 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
21. See Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 449 (1957).
22. EPIC Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1616 (2018).
23. See Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 467-68 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Examples include: the exception applied only to transportation workers; the
absence of congressional action to reverse extension of FAA to employment contracts; Congress did
specifically modify EEOC to add arbitration.
24. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
25. See id.
26. Id. at 23 (stating the parties never raised the FAA employment contract exception during litigation, so
the court was not compelled to rule on it).
27. Id. at 24 (stating the Court established that arbitration was suitable for resolution of substantive issues
unless Congress expressly precluded the enforcement via the text, legislative history, or underlying purpose).
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attenuation of the arbitration requirement from the employment relationship was
determined to be enough to avoid the FAA exemption.
The dissent was unmoved by the distinction of third-party action compelling
arbitration. An employment agreement is an employment agreement, and as
such, is exempt from FAA coverage.28 The dissent would prefer to exempt from
FAA protection employment agreements that are conditioned upon acceptance
of arbitration as the means to settle employment disputes. The dissent felt that
an employee in those cases should be allowed to pursue grievances, contractual
or statutory, in a judicial forum.29 The dissent further reminded us that earlier
courts had found no difference between collectively or individually bargained
employment contracts with respect to FAA exemption.30 At this moment in
time, represented and non-represented worker employment contracts were
considered the same in effect.
Throughout the history of the case, the animus toward arbitration was on
full display. The Court devoted two and a half pages31 rebutting the perceived
limitations of arbitration as a process and the competency of arbitrators. The
Court corrected its prior decision in Gardner-Denver Co. in which the Court
had expressed that arbitration of statutory claims was inferior to judicial
resolution.32 The decision in Gilmer reinforces the premise that arbitration is an
equivalent forum for resolution of both contractual and statutory claims.33
That is not to say that arbitration is a replacement for judicial processes.
Arbitration can only handle controversies arising out of the contract, like a
refusal to perform in whole or part, or a written agreement to submit to
arbitration related to an ongoing controversy.34 The arbiter’s power is
exclusively granted and limited by the agreement entered into by the parties. 35
Arbitration can handle complex issues and larger classes of parties,36 but that
does not mean that arbiters are able to entertain legal theories outside of the
scope of authority. The important aspect of Gilmer was that arbitration clauses
in employment contracts would be held enforceable under the FAA. At the time
28. Id. at 40 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
29. See Id. at 41-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 41 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court in Lincoln Mills had never explicitly ruled that
the FAA exemption for employment contracts was binding on individual or collectively bargained
employment contracts. But it also did not overrule the 5th Cir. which had determined that the exemption
precluded employment agreements from FAA coverage).
31. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30–32 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 34, n. 5 (citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 94 (1974)).
33. Id. at 30 (going further the Court said that a party does not lose the substantive rights afforded by a
statute if it resolves the conflict via arbitration (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 634, (1985))).
34. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 262 (2009).
35. Id. at 263 (citing Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 744 (1981)).
36. Brief for National Academy of Arbitrators as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, EPIC Sys. Corp.
v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018) (2017 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2838) (describing the ability of arbitration
to handle class or collective arbitrations dealing with substantive law and contractual issues).
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of Gilmer in 1991, most employment contracts that contained arbitration clauses
were collective bargaining agreements. These were made possible by the
passage of two key statutes, the Norris-LaGuardia Act (NLGA) 37 and the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).38
III. ENTER THE NLRA
At the time of FAA passage there was no federal protection for the
formation of unions or collective bargaining. This changed with the passage of
the NLGA39 in 1932 and completed with the NLRA 40 in 1935. These statutes
opened the door for employees to form labor organizations and collectively
bargain for better wages, benefits, and working conditions. The NLRA policy
rationales included reducing the number of strikes and work stoppages, which
directly impacted the flow of commerce within the United States.41 Low worker
productivity had the effect of raising consumer prices and curtailing supply
which was especially crippling to New Deal42 attempts to offset the great
depression.
Once collective bargaining began to take hold, it was inevitable that the
resolution of employment contract issues would be settled by non-judicial
means. While there was no express condition for arbitration mentioned in the
1935 Act, the Act did encourage “practices fundamental to the friendly
adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages, hours,
or other working conditions . . . .”43 The evolution in labor law was leading
collective bargaining agreements to allocate more and more of the potential
disputes to alternative resolution procedures, like arbitration.
Collective bargaining agreements usually require individual employees to
submit issues and grievances to the union. The union collates and decides which
issues have merit and presents them individually or collectively to the employer
for resolution. Many contracts require mediation as a first step, followed by
arbitration, and then filing a complaint with an appropriate regulatory agency.

37. Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §101 (2021).
38. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §151 (2021).
39. See Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §101 (2021).
40. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §151 (2021).
41. Id.
42. See generally Emergency Banking Act, Pub. L. 73-1, 48 Stat. 1 (1933); Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L.
73-66, 48 Stat. 162; Federal Emergency Relief Act (FERA), Pub. L. 72-302, 47 Stat. 709 (1932); National
Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), Pub. L. 73-67, 48 Stat. 195 (1933); Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. 74271, 49 Stat. 620; Fair Labor Standards Act, Pub. L. 75-718, 53 Stat. 1060 (1938); Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, HISTORY. COM (Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.history.com/topics/great-depression/history-ofthe-fdic; Works Progress Administration (WPA), HISTORY.COM (Jun. 10, 2019), https://www.hi
story.com/topic s/great-depre ssion/works-progress-administration.
43. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §151 (2021).
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In shop environments, grievances could also be addressed real time with the
employer through an appointed shop steward.
In the professional sports arena, the NLRA changed the relationship
dynamic between athletes and team owners. Prior to collective action, team
owners as employers were under no pressure to deal with players consistently
or fairly.44 For instance, owners could contract two players of similar
performance levels with entirely different compensation schemes. Major stars
of the game received slightly better treatment, but the journeyman player
worked without contract minimums, or guarantees.45 Like many employers of
their day, the owners were reluctant to provide fundamental benefits like proper
safety equipment, medical insurance, and pensions unless forced to do so.46 The
NLRA changed that by expressly defining “unfair labor practices” exposing
owners and leagues to fines and sanctions.47
Players unions and associations began to utilize arbitration to resolve
contractual issues and grievances arising under the collectively bargained
agreements. Many of these agreements contain alternate arbitration pathways
depending on the type of dispute.48 In the NBA collective bargaining agreement
there is an express arbitration procedure by which an issue can be heard within
44. See Cym H. Lowell, Collective Bargaining and the Professional Team Sport Industry, 38 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (1973) (commenting on the improvement that collective bargaining brought to
professional sports. The bare-bones benefits received was compounded by owners viewing players as property
for use as they saw fit. The dreaded “reserve clause” under which the careers of players could be at the mercy
of capricious owners who would routinely blacklist or freeze out players. Okay that behavior still exists. The
idea that players could oppose owner actions or force them to act reasonably was hard to conceive prior to the
NLRA).
45. See generally Ryan T. Dryer, Beyond the Box Score: A Look at Collective Bargaining Agreements in
Professional Sports and Their Effect on Competition, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 267 (2008).
46. See generally OSHA Celebrates 40 Years of Accomplishments in the Workplace, U.S. DEPT’T OF LAB.,
https://www.osha.gov/osha40/OSHATimeline.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2021) (Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) established safety standards – 1971); Aaron E. Carroll, The Real Reason the
U.S. Has Employee-Sponsored Health Insurance, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.co
m/2017/09/05/upshot/the-real-reason-the-us-has-employer-sponsored-health-insurance.html (National War
Labor Board provides a tax exemption for employee provided health insurance – 1942); Internal Steven A.
Bank, Revenue Act of 1954, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, https://www.encyclopedia.com/history/encyclop ediasalmanacs-transcripts-and-maps/internal-revenue-a ct-1954 (last visited Mar. 27, 2021) (Revenue Act
established tax exemptions for employer provided pensions – 1954).
47. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §151 (2021).
48. See e.g., Collective Bargaining Agreement between National Hockey League and National Hockey
League Players’ Association, NHLPA (Set. 16, 2012), https://www.nhlpa.com/the-pa/cba [hereinafter NHL
CBA] (describing the NHL CBA’s salary, impartial and system arbitration procedures); Collective Bargaining
Agreement, NBPA (Jan. 19, 2017), https://cosmic-s3.imgix.net/3c7a0a50-8e11-11e9-875d-3d44e94ae33f2017-NBA-NBPA-Collective-Bargaining-Agreement.pdf [hereinafter NBA CBA] (stating the NBA utilizes
impartial, system and an expedited arbitration procedure); Collective Bargaining Agreement, NFLPA (Aug.
4, 2011), https://nflpaweb.blob.core.windows. net/media/Default/PDFs/2011%20CBA%20Updated%20w
ith%20Side%20Letters%20thru%201-5-15.pdf [hereinafter NFL CBA] (stating the NFL uses a benefits,
impartial and system arbitration path); Collective Bargaining Agreement between Major League Soccer and
Major League Soccer Players Union, MLSPA, https://s3.amazonaws.com/mlspa/Collective-BargainingAgreement-February-1-2015.pdf?mtime=20180213190926 [hereinafter MLS CBA] (stating the MLS uses a
single arbitration procedure for all disputes); 2017-2021 Basic Agreement, MLBPA, https://www.mlbplayers.
com/cba [hereinafter MLB CBA] (last visited Mar. 7, 2021).
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24 hours of a grievance being filed.49 The requirement for employees to use
contractually mandated dispute resolution in collective bargaining agreements
has not been without challenge.
IV. PYETT (STATUTORY CLAIMS)
The court in Pyett50 faced a situation like Gilmer51 in which a worker
challenged the arbitration requirement of an employment contract. In this case
the employee was covered by a collective bargaining agreement. The lower
courts held that a collective bargaining agreement could not waive an
individual’s rights to seek a judicial forum for statutory claims.52 The lower
courts were not sure if Gilmer had superseded a prior holding in GardnerDenver with respect to collective bargaining agreements.53
The NLRA54 provides that an individual can be represented in all matters55
by the “labor organization.”56 In Pyett, the court determined that the use of
arbitration was “part and parcel of the collective bargaining process itself”57 and
that a statutory grievance58 was no different than any other grievance to be
addressed. The court could find nothing in the law that suggested a distinction
between individually or collectively bargained agreements on the permissibility
of arbitration clauses.59 The court did suggest that if the parties wished to
arbitrate statutory claims it should be “explicitly stated”60 in the collective
bargaining agreement.
49. NBA CBA, supra note 48.
50. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009).
51. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
52. Pyett v. Pa. Bldg. Co., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35952 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 2006); Pyett v. Pa. Bldg. Co.,
498 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2007).
53. See Pyett, 498 F.3d at 92.
54. National Labor Relation Act 29 U.S.C §152(5), §2(5) (2021) (stating the freedom to contract is one of
the fundamental policies of the NLRA).
55. 14 Penn Plaza LLC., 556 U.S. at 274–75, 279 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (voicing concerns that the
reversal of Gardner-Denver would negatively impact individual employees’ rights to bring statutory claims
against employers. The central thrust is a discomfort with collective bargaining as it subordinates the rights
of the individual with respect to the best interests of the collective. The dissent further suggested that stare
decisis provides that an individual may waive their rights in an employment contract, but not in a collectively
bargained agreement (Souter, J. citing Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 80 (1998))).
56. National Labor Relation Act 29 U.S.C §152(5), §2(5) (2021) (defining the NLRA as “any organization
of any kind, or an agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and
which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor
disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions or work”). For professional athletes, the
collective bargaining is done by player associations and not traditional unions. Even though the associations
are recognized by traditional unions like the AFL-CIO or Teamsters.
57. 14 Penn Plaza LLC., 556 U.S. at 256 (citing Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448
(1957)).
58. Id. at 251 (stating Pyett was an age discrimination case under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA) of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2000)).
59. Id. at 258.
60. Id. at 258.
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V. TAG IN ANOTHER COMBATANT – NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Pyett seemed to close the door on challenges to FAA enforcement of
arbitration clauses in employment contracts. Not so fast, in 2012 the NLRB
began invalidating individualized arbitration clauses per Section 7 of the
NLRA.61 Two rationales were offered, the first was a right of employees “to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection . . . .”62 The NLRB reasoned that “mutual aid or
protection” included the efforts of an employee to pursue63 class action suits for
similarly situated employees.64 The second was that an arbitration clause that
“explicitly prohibits the filing of claims with the Board or, more generally, with
administrative agencies must be found unlawful.”65 The Board has applied this
to arbitration clauses which “when reasonably interpreted”66 would lead an
employee to believe that only arbitration can be used to pursue disputes against
the employer.
VI. IS CLASS ACTION AN NLRA RIGHT?
The pivotal case involved an employee working as a construction
superintendent for D.R. Horton who, as a condition of employment, signed a
Mutual Arbitration Agreement (MAA). The MAA contained two passages that
were particularly troubling to the NLRB. The first was for employees “to submit
all employment related disputes and claims to arbitration”67 and the second that
the arbitrator “may hear only Employee’s individual claims and does not have
the authority to fashion a proceeding as a class or collective action . . . .”68 The
NLRB determined that the limitation of arbitration to individual claims would
foreclose an employee’s right to provide “mutual aid or protection” as preserved
in Section 7.69 Furthermore, any employment contract that violated Section 7
would be illegal and unenforceable.70 An illegal contract is not eligible for FAA
protection due to the “saving clause” of the FAA.71

61. In re D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 NLRB 2277 (N.L.R.B. Jan. 3, 2012).
62. Federal Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.S § 157 (2021).
63. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 2015 NLRB 774 (N.L.R.B. Oct. 26, 2015).
64. In re D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 NLRB at 2286.
65. E. A. Renfroe & Co., 2019 NLRB LEXIS 710 (N.L.R.B. Dec. 16, 2019).
66. Boeing Co., 2017 NLRB LEXIS 634 (N.L.R.B. Dec. 14, 2017).
67. In Re D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 NLRB at 2278.
68. Id. at 2291.
69. Id. at 2283.
70. Id. at 2286.
71. See D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 348, 358 (5th Cir. 2013).
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The Fifth Circuit ultimately refused to affirm the Board’s decision and ruled
that access to class action suits are not substantive rights but procedural ones.72
The court referenced numerous rulings73 that provided no substantive right to
proceed collectively. Class action attorneys may wish for a substantive right of
clients to file a class action, but the Fifth Circuit could not find one. The NLRB
continued this reasoning in similar cases, some of which were affirmed by other
circuits74 setting the stage for the battle royal, EPIC Systems Corporation.
VII. THE SHOWDOWN, EPIC SYSTEMS CORP.
EPIC Systems Corporation75 encompassed three cases, Ernst & Young, LLP
v. Morris,76 Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB77 and Lewis v. EPIC Systems, Corp.78
The question was if an employee has a right to class or collective action if they
agreed to be bound by individual arbitration?79 The employees alleged job
misclassification80 and wished to recover lost overtime payments via class
action.81 When large employers are involved, class action suits can result in big
settlements and fees for attorneys. In contrast, individualized arbitration
disputes are smaller and less attractive as fee generators.82
72. Id. at 359.
73. Id. at 357–58 (citing AmChem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 612-613 (1997); Deposit Guar.
Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 332 (1980); Reed v. Fla. Metro. Univ. Inc., 681 F.3d 630, 643 (5th Cir.
2012); Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064 (2013); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
500 U.S. 20, 32 (1991); Carter v. Countrywide Credit Indus. Inc., 362 F.3d 294, 298 (5th Cir. 2004); Adkins
v. Labor Ready, Inc., 303 F.3d 496, 506 (4th Cir. 2002); Kuehner v. Dickinson & Co., 84 F.3d 316, 319-320
(9th Cir. 1996)).
74. The Seventh and Ninth Circuits endorsed and affirmed the actions of the NLRB in granting class action
as a statutory right. See Stephanie Greene & Christine Neylon O’Brien, EPIC Backslide: The Supreme Court
Endorses Mandatory Individual Arbitration Agreement--#TimesUp on Workers’ Rights, 15 STAN. J. C.R. &
C.L. 43 (2019).
75. EPIC Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).
76. Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016).
77. Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015). Interestingly, the procedural history
of Murphy Oil USA, Inc. is a doppelganger of D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 348 (5th Cir. 2013). The
NLRB repeated its ruling that the agreement to individualized arbitration foreclosed collective action in
violation of Section 7 of the NLRA. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 808 F.3d 1013. The NLRB then petitioned the
Fifth Circuit of Appeals to review the petition en banc to overrule its decision in D.R. Horton. Id. The Fifth
Circuit of Appeals was “disinclined to acquiesce to their request.” Id.; PIRATES OF THE CARIBBEAN: THE
CURSE OF THE BLACK PEARL (Walt Disney Pictures 2003).
78. Lewis v. EPIC Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016).
79. Numerous circuits followed the Fifth Circuit’s lead in D.R.Horton: see Walthour v. Chipio Windshield
Repair, LLC, 745 F.3d 1326, 1336 (11th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 573 U.S. 948 (2014); Richards v. Ernst &
Young, LLP, 744 F.3d 1072, 1075 n.3 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 574 U.S. 932 (2014); Owen v. Bristol
Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050, 1053–55 (8th Cir. 2013); Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 726 F.3d 290, 297 n.8
(2d Cir. 2013).
80. See Blake R. Bertanga, The “Miscellaneous Employee”: Exploring the Boundaries of the Fair Labor
Standards Act’s Administrative Exemption, 29 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L. J. 485 (2012).
81. Id. at 497.
82. EPIC Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1647 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Class actions of this type are not new. It was estimated that in the early
2000’s employers were spending nearly $2 billion a year in job classification
class-action settlements.83 This might lead one to believe that employers are
villains,84 but the classification of jobs exempt from wage and overtime
regulations is statutory.85 The exempt classifications are fixed while the wage
basis of employees is continually changing. Almost 11 million service sector
jobs were added prior to the 2004 revamp that met the antiquated exempt
categories. These employees would have traditionally been subject to wage and
overtime regulations.
Newton’s third law of motion defines that “for every action . . . there is an
equal [but] opposite reaction.”86 In response to the onslaught of class action
suits, employer’s began requiring employees to agree to individualized
arbitration as a condition of employment. Represented workers have long used
arbitration to settle grievances and contractual disputes. For non-represented
workers, especially lower-level executive, administrative and professional
workers this was a new development.
To offset the use of individualized arbitration the NLRB and the dissent in
EPIC Systems Corporation wished to expand the NLRA to include class action
under the “mutual aid or protection” umbrella. Invalidating87 individualized
arbitration in favor of class action could overcome the perceived reluctance of
lawyers88 to take low fee cases.89 A right to class action was already in the
Federal Labor Standards Act (FLSA)90 permitting employees to collectively

83. Bertanga, supra note 81, at 498 (citing Mark Wilson, Omnibus Spending Bill Provisions Pt. I: New
Overtime Law to End Pay for Up to 8 Million Workers, DEMOCRACY NOW (Jan. 22, 2004),
https://www.democracynow.org/2004/1/2 2/omnibus_spending_bill_provisions_pt_i).
84. See EPIC Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1633. It is true that in some cases an employer will classify
employees incorrectly to avoid labor costs, but that it is partly due to the legislative branch not updating the
categories on regular basis.
85. 29 U.S.C.A. § 213 (2021).
86. NASA, Newton’s Third Law: Applied to Aerodynamics, GLENN RSCH. CTR.,
https://www.grc.nasa.gov/WWW/K12/airplane/newton3.html#:~:text=His%20third%20law%20states%20th
at,opposite%20force%20on%20object%20A (last visited Feb. 24, 2021) (citing Issac Newton, Principia
Mathematica Philosophiae Naturalis (1686)).
87. EPIC Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1646. The dissent sees the NLRA as “an implied repeal” of the FAA in
the event of conflict between the two statutes. Id.
88. Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 768 F. Supp. 2d 547, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing Caban v. J.P.
Morgan Chase & Co., 606 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 1371 (S.D. Fla. 2009)) (“Sutherland's only option in pursuing
her individual claim is thus to retain an attorney on a contingent fee basis. But just as no rational person would
expend hundreds of thousands of dollars to recover a few thousand dollars in damages, ‘no attorney (regardless
of competence) would ever take such a case on a contingent fee basis’").
89. SAMUEL ESTREICHER & JOY RADICE, BEYOND ELITE LAW: ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE IN AMERICA,
Preface (2016) (ebook) (postulating that persons making less than $50,000 USD per year would not be able
to afford legal representation for claims such as: nonfatal medical malpractice, non-class action employment
disputes, minor housing disputes, wills and guardianships, divorces, child custody, warranty consumer claims,
bankruptcy, denied governmental claims, veterans seeking mental health or medical assistance from the VA,
immigrants seeking asylum) (emphasis added).
90. Federal Labor Standards Act 29 U.S.C.S §§ 201-19 (2021).
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recover lost wages. It seems a drastic action to create an additional NLRA right
just to allow attorneys to recover higher fees.
The dissent made a curious comment that the opportunity cost for selecting
arbitration is unfavorable when compared to judicial remedies.91 This was based
on figures provided in a parallel case involving Ernst & Young.92 The plaintiff
entered into the record, uncontested by the defendant, an arbitration cost
estimate of $160,000 for attorney’s fees, costs of $6,000, and an expert in
accountancy which may exceed $33,500.93 What? The plaintiff’s case was for
an overtime loss of roughly $1,867.02.94 The Plaintiff went further to complain
that an award of fees was at the discretion of the arbitrator and therefore
unreasonable. Discretion of a judge seems to be preferred to that of an arbitrator.
A typical arbitration costs95 between $1,000 to $3,000 dollars for costs and
share of arbitrator’s fees.96 One would hope that attorney’s fees for a single
arbitration are no more than the arbiter’s fees, but that still places the breakeven
cost of arbitration at around $6,000. This scenario favors the employer until the
value of the worker’s individual claim exceeds the breakeven point. This is true
of both arbitration and judicial action. Collective action spreads the costs over
more contributors reducing the energy barrier to initiate dispute resolution. Once
a critical mass of workers claims is reached, the balance shifts in the workers’
favor to obtain fair settlement.
It is safe to pose that arbitration is more economical than judicial relief, and
collective action has a higher return on investment than individual suit. 97 The
best possible outcome for workers would be collective arbitration. This is the
model unions have been using for decades to resolve workplace disputes. The
dissent in EPIC Systems Corporation parroting the NLRB advocated instead for
contingent representation of a class action and a judicial forum where fee
shifting provisions were in place.
Judicial class action would seem to be a panacea for employees to obtain
justice. A better description would be that it deters employers from engaging in
or repeating the practice in the future. Judicial class action doesn’t always
provide relief for affected employees. In Hobon,98 delivery drivers for Pizza Hut
filed a class action under the FLSA to recover unpaid delivery expenses. The
91. EPIC Sys. Corp., 138 U.S. at 1636, 1647 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
92. Sutherland, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 547.
93. Id. at 551–52.
94. Id.
95. See generally Paul Stephan, Nothing to Say for the FAA: Why Arbitration Does Not Offer Unparalleled
and Mutual Benefits, UNIV. OF MEM. L. REV., Forthcoming, 42-43 (Feb. 1, 2020).
96. See A. Michael Froomkin, ICANN’s Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy’—Causes and (Partial) Cures,
67 BROOK. L. REV. 605, 676 (2002).
97. Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Class Actions and Class Action Waivers, 23 SUP. CT. ECON.
REV. 305, 308 (2015).
98. Hobon v. Pizza Hut of Southern WI, Inc., No. 17-cv-947-slc, 2019 WL 3765832, at *1 (W.D. Wis.
Aug. 9, 2019).
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class action was handled by a single law firm that ultimately negotiated a
settlement of $500,000, to which $195,613 was paid in attorney’s fees and
costs.99 The individual drivers received $144.03 as compensation, is that justice?
Who really benefitted from the action?
In the EPIC Systems Corporation majority opinion, the Court reiterated that
the purpose of the FAA was to provide parties with a method to resolve
contractual disputes without resorting to judicial action.100 At the heart of the
disagreement is whether the NLRA can be used to deem an employment
contract unconscionable,101 or revocable102 and subject to the saving clause of
the FAA. The Court suggested that the conditions for revocation or illegality of
a contract were limited to generally applicable defenses of fraud, duress, or
unconscionability.103 The Court settled on what is not included are “defenses
that apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning from the fact that an
agreement to arbitrate is at issue.”104 It would be odd to say that an arbitration
clause renders the contract illegal, thus exempting it from the Act that says the
arbitration clauses are legal. Nice try.
VIII. EPIC SYSTEMS CORP. AND UNCONSCIONABILITY
Justice Thomas in concurrence105 thought that unconscionability was
resolved in earlier cases like American Express106 and Concepcion107. The
saving clause is limited to defenses that may be invoked related to contract
formation, not public policy issues that render a contract illegal. This public
policy argument is still being used to invalidate arbitration provisions in
employment contracts. In a state law case, Ramos, a California Appeals Court
ruled that in California, class action waivers can be unconscionable in
employment contracts. 108 It was acknowledged that Concepcion established the
preemption of the FAA and overruled a California law banning class action
waivers in consumer contracts. What was distinguished was that Concepcion
never referenced employment contracts or overruled the leading case in
California, Armendariz.109 As such the California court viewed mandatory
99. Id.
100. See EPIC Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1621 (2018).
101. Id. at 1622 (citing AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011)).
102. See Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013, 1018 (5th Cir. 2015).
103. EPIC Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1616 (2018) (citing AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S.
333, 339 (2011)).
104. Id. at 1622.
105. Id. at 1632–33.
106. Id. at 1632 (citing Am. Express Co., v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 239 (2013) (Thomas, J.,
concurring)).
107. Id. at 1633 (citing AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 353 (2011) (Thomas, J.,
concurring)).
108. Ramos v. Superior Court, 239 Cal. Rptr. 3d 679, 691-95 (Cal. App. 5th 2018).
109. See generally Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Serv., Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000).
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arbitration clauses covering statutory claims in employment contracts
unconscionable. Wait, wasn’t this covered in Pyett?
The California courts view employment contracts as contracts of adhesion
unless the potential employee can negotiate the terms.110 Gilmer established that
unequal bargaining power is not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration
clauses in employment contracts are never enforceable.111 Collective bargaining
agreements can be viewed as contracts of adhesion like any other employment
contract.112 To be fair, there is value in having collective negotiating power and
comfort in “better the devil you know than the devil you don’t.”113 But for the
employee to earn a paycheck they must accept the terms of the agreement
whether collectively bargained for or not.114 This is especially true of workers
who are hired during the term of the collective agreement as they neither
participated in its creation or ratification.
A similar approach succeeded in Ziglar in which a clause to arbitrate was
invalidated under Arizona employment laws.115 The clause was deemed
unconscionable because it did not specifically allow for treble damages,
attorney’s fees, costs, or hardship cost reduction as permitted under Arizona
wage statutes and judicial procedures.116 Once more it was posited that the
attorney’s fees for arbitration would be insurmountable for an individual
employee to bear without fee shifting. In Arizona, the arbitration clause must
incorporate every aspect of state employment law and judicial procedure. Is this
really going to make arbitration more effective? This is a “ticky tack” 117 whistle
on an NBA player for hand checking, it may be true but was the foul necessary?
Overall, EPIC Systems Corporation did not have a profound effect on
professional sports. Team sports are predominantly covered by collective
bargaining agreements or athletes are represented by players associations.

110. Ramos, 239 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 691 (describing how collectively bargained agreements are exempted,
they are perceived to be negotiated on equal terms).
111. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991).
112. Id. at 36 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Hearing on S. 4213 and S.4214, Subcommittee on the
Judiciary, 67th Cong., 4th Sess., 9 (1923). The dissent in Gilmer quoted Senator Walsh who stated that “It is
the same with a good many contracts of employment. A man says ‘These are our terms. All right, take it or
leave it.’ Well, there is nothing for the man to do except to sign it”).
113. The Phrase Finder, PHRASES.ORG, https://www.phrases.org.uk/bulletin_b oard/5/messages/791.html
(Last visited Mar. 5th, 2021) (stating that the phrase has been attributed to R. Taverner, Collection of Irish
Proverbs, 1539).
114. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 275 (citing Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System,
Inc., 450 U.S. 744, (1981) The dissent reiterated the concern that collectively bargained terms benefit the
majority and may not serve the interests of an individual employee. In that scenario it doesn’t matter to that
employee how the bargain was struck; the result is the same “take it or leave it.” Id.
115. Ziglar v. Express Messenger Sys. Inc., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34951.
116. Id.
117. A ticky tack foul is a basketball term to describe an unnecessary foul called by the referee. The
purported foul did not disrupt game play or involve significant contact between players.
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Individual sport athletes are considered independent contractors118 and outside
the scope of the NLRA. The independent contractor designation also applies to
many of the support staff and vendors used to stage athletic events. Professional
sport operates with a significant portion of the labor pool outside the scope of
the battle between the FAA and NLRA. What EPIC Systems Corporation did
was challenge the NLRB to find alternative rationales to invalidate employment
contracts.
IX. DO ARBITRATION CLAUSES NEED DISCLAIMERS?
Apparently so. Since the demise of the Section 7 class action right in EPIC
Systems Corporation the NLRB has emphasized the importance of the second
D.R. Horton invalidation theory. An arbitration clause can be invalidated for not
informing the employee of administrative law options available to them. If the
Board feels that the language misleads employees into thinking that arbitration
“restricts employee access to the Board and its processes,”119 then it violates
Section 7 of the NLRA. The arbitration clause is deemed invalid and
unenforceable. Since EPIC Systems Corporation NLRB judges have issued
more than 20 opinions120 invalidating arbitration clauses using this approach.121
Gilmer established that a clause that forbids filing an administrative agency
action is invalid.122 The murky view is when arbitration clauses are facially

118. See Vincent Salminen, UFC Fighters Are Taking a Beating Because They Are Misclassified as
Independent Contractors. An Employee Classification Would Change the Fight Game for the UFC, Its
Fighters, and MMA, 7 PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. L. F. 193 (2017).
119. Hooters Ontario Mills, 2020 NLRB LEXIS 151, at *1 (N.L.R.B. May 6, 2020).
120. See, e.g., id.; see, e.g., IIG Wireless, Inc., 2020 NLRB LEXIS 223 (N.L.R.B. Apr. 30, 2020); Aryzta,
LLC, 2020 NLRB LEXIS 256 (N.L.R.B. Apr. 13, 2020); Dynamic Nursing Servs., Inc., 2020 NLRB LEXIS
136 (N.L.R.B. Mar. 27, 2020); Countrywide Fin. Corp., 2020 NLRB LEXIS 27 (N.L.R.B. Jan. 24, 2020);
Bloomingdale’s Inc., 2020 NLRB LEXIS 19 (N.L.R.B. Jan. 21, 2020); Haynes Bldg. Servs., LLC, 2019
NLRB LEXIS 737 (N.L.R.B. Dec. 23, 2019); CBRE, Inc., 2019 NLRB LEXIS 735 (N.L.R.B. Dec. 16, 2019);
E.A. Renfroe & Co., 2019 NLRB LEXIS 710 (N.L.R.B. Dec. 16, 2019); Uber Techs. Inc., 2019 NLRB LEXIS
716 (N.L.R.B. Dec. 12, 2019); Kelly Servs. Inc., 2019 NLRB LEXIS 705 (N.L.R.B. Dec. 12, 2019); Private
Nat’l Mortg. Acceptance Co. LLC, 2019 NLRB LEXIS 684 (N.L.R.B. Dec. 9, 2019); Keiser Univ., 2019
NLRB LEXIS 669 (N.L.R.B. Nov. 27, 2019); Four Seasons Healthcare & Wellness Ctr., LP, 2019 NLRB
LEXIS 654 (N.L.R.B. Nov. 21, 2019); Planet Beauty, 2019 NLRB LEXIS 551 (N.L.R.B. Oct. 8, 2019);
Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 2019 NLRB LEXIS 542 (N.L.R.B. Sept. 30, 2019); Prime Healthcare Paradise Valley,
LLC, 2019 NLRB LEXIS 351 (N.L.R.B. Jun. 18, 2019); GC Servs. Ltd. P’ship, 2019 NLRB LEXIS 187
(N.L.R.B. Mar. 19, 2019); Concord Honda, 2019 NLRB LEXIS 166 (N.L.R.B. Mar. 7, 2019); We Work Cos.
Inc., 2019 NLRB LEXIS 155 (N.L.R.B. Mar. 1, 2019); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 2019 NLRB LEXIS 17
(N.L.R.B. Jan. 2, 2019); Applebee’s, 2018 NLRB LEXIS 611 (N.L.R.B. Dec. 4, 2018).
121. Ironically, the Board waits for an aggrieved employee to file an NLRA or FLSA action so it can
invalidate the arbitration clause on the basis that the language of the clause leads the employee to believe they
cannot file an NLRA or FLSA action.
122. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991) (resolving this issue in Gilmer when
the Court pushed back on the idea that arbitration would undermine agency enforcement of statutory rights.
“An individual ADEA claimant subject to an arbitration agreement will still be free to file a charge with the
EEOC, even though the claimant is not able to institute a private judicial action”).
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neutral123 and do not address issues beyond the clause itself.124 The Board
focuses on determiners like “any” 125 and “all” to extrapolate that the “reasonable
interpretation”126 of the clause by employees would be to prohibit access to the
Board and its processes. The arbitration clauses that are found lawful have
conspicuously displayed verbiage excepting agency action from arbitration. 127
This is a collateral strike on arbitration which skirts the direct assault prohibition
penned in EPIC Systems Corporation.128
A quirky outcome of this approach is the possible effect on employment
contracts including collective bargaining agreements. A survey of various
professional sports collective bargaining agreements129 reveals that arbitration
clauses do not mention the NLRA or any administrative agency. There is no
disclaimer language and “any” and “all” are used to describe the breadth of
arbitration coverage. Are we to believe that represented workers are necessarily
foreclosed from filing unfair labor practice actions? Of course not. Are these
clauses going to be determined to be invalid, rendering arbitration unusable?
No, because the NLRB views collective bargaining agreements as being valid
and enforceable merely because they were collectively bargained.
This seems to create a diverging set of rights for represented and nonrepresented workers. It was established in Pyett130 that an employee subject to
123. Boeing, 2017 NLRB LEXIS 634, 2 (N.L.R.B. Dec. 14, 2017) (stating if a work rule or employment
contract clause does not “explicitly restrict” Section 7 rights, then it is considered facially neutral).
124. See generally WARREN’S FORMS OF AGREEMENTS, FORM 40.2.15 Executive Employment Agreement
with Grant of Phantom Stock Options, FORM 770-40.2.15, LEXIS; CALIFORNIA LEGAL FORMS TRANSACTION
GUIDE, Employment Agreements: Termination of Employment, FORM 187-CL-85.120.11, LEXIS (Matthew
Bender & Company, Inc.); 28 California Legal Forms--Transaction Guide § 85.551 (2020) Provision for
Compulsory Arbitration of Matters in Dispute; WARREN'S FORMS OF AGREEMENTS FORM, 40.2.01 ATWILL EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT (Matthew Bender & Company, Inc.); D. PATRICK O’REILLY & D.
BRIAN KACEDON, DRAFTING PATENT LICENSE AGREEMENTS 327 (8th ed. 2015).
125. Clauses, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, https://adr.org/Clauses (last visited Mar. 5, 2020)(stating that the
American Arbitration Association example clauses for arbitration use “any” as the determiner to describe
controversies and claims, but does not mention other available remedies, it only focuses on arbitration. “Any
controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this [employment application; employment ADR program;
employment contract] shall be settled by arbitration administered by the American Arbitration Association
under its Employment Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures and judgment upon the award rendered by
the arbitrator(s) may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof”).
126. Boeing, NLRB at 7, 16 (discussing that the NLRB instituted an updated test to evaluate work rules
that encumbered Section 7 rights. The first prong of the test is to determine if a rule when reasonably
interpreted “would have no tendency to interfere with Section 7 rights and therefore no balancing of rights
and justifications is warranted.” It remains to be seen if this test will fare better than the previous Lutheran
Heritage Village-Livonia test. After 15 years of implementation the NLRB had to finally admit it “defied all
reasonable efforts to make it yield predictable results”).
127. See Royal Motor Sales, 2020 NLRB LEXIS 294 (N.L.R.B. May 8, 2020); see also Wendy’s Rest.,
2019 NLRB LEXIS 510 (N.L.R.B. Sept. 11, 2019).
128. EPIC Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1622 (2018) (determining that the FAA saving clause did
not allow for “defenses that apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning from the fact than an
agreement to arbitrate is at issue”).
129. NFL CBA, supra note 48; NBA CBA, supra note 48; MLS CBA, supra note 48; NHL CBA, supra
note 48.
130. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 262 (2009).
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collective bargaining can have their section 7 rights prospectively waived by the
labor organization. The NLRB reiterated this position in D.R. Horton131 by
stating that the waiver of choice of dispute resolution was legal because it was
collectively bargained for. Labor unions in their EPIC Systems Corporation
amicus brief132 expressed that non-represented workers cannot prospectively
waive their statutory rights to collective adjudication. An individual employee
cannot waive their rights, but a labor organization can? 133
Professional sports cover both represented, mostly team, and nonrepresented, individual, participants. The rule seemingly provides that
represented workers get “one bite of the apple” and are bound by the collective
agreement.134 Conversely, a non-represented worker can make an agreement
and not be bound because the Board views individual employment contracts as
contracts of adhesion needing a disclaimer.135 Essentially an arbitration clause
sans disclaimer is deemed invalid and unenforceable against non-represented
workers, but the same clause applied to represented workers is valid? That
doesn’t feel right.136
Consider the case of DeMeco Ryans,137 an NFL player bound by a collective
bargaining agreement. Ryans was a player for the Philadelphia Eagles injured
in a game against the Houston Texans. Ryans maintains that his injury was
caused by the playing conditions of the field used by the Texans. This injury
was career ending and Ryans filed a negligence action in the selection of an
“unreasonably dangerous” artificial turf.138 The case was dismissed in favor of
arbitration as Ryans was subject to an arbitration clause in the NFL collective
bargaining agreement.139
131. In re D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 NLRB 2277, 2287 (N.L.R.B. Jan. 3, 2012).
132. Brief for Ten Int’l Lab. Unions, Nat’l Emp. Law Project, and Nat’l Emp. Law. Ass’n as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, EPIC Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018) (Nos. 16-285, 16-300, and 16307), 2017 LEXIS 2893 at 54.
133. D.R. Horton, 357 NLRB at 2286 (acknowledging that this question had already been addressed in
Pyett when that court could see no “distinction between the status of arbitration agreements signed by an
individual employee and those agreed to by a union representative”).
134. Id. (arguing that once an employee has collectively bargained, they have effectively traded their rights,
like the right to strike, in return for concessions from the employer, and the resulting employment contract
satisfies the collective action elements of section 7 and like checking a box, the contract terms therefore must
comply with the NLRA).
135. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 39 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing
Hearing on S. 4213 and S.4214, Subcommittee on the Judiciary, 67th Cong., 4th Sess., 9 (1923), the dissent
in Gilmer quoted Senator Walsh who stated that “It is the same with a good many contracts of employment.
A man says ‘These are our terms. All right, take it or leave it.’ Well, there is nothing for the man to do except
to sign it”).
136. See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 275 (2009) (citing Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight
System, Inc., 450 U.S. 744 (1981) (the dissent reiterated the concern that collectively bargained terms benefit
the majority and may not serve the interests of an individual employee, and in that scenario it doesn’t matter
to that employee how the bargain was struck, the result is the same “take it or leave it”).
137. Houston NFL Holding L.P. v. Ryans, 581 S.W.3d 900 (Tex. App. 2019).
138. Id. at 904.
139. Id. at 911; NFL CBA, supra note 48.
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Contrast that with Randy Couture, 140 an MMA fighter wishing to switch
promotors. Randy was under contract with Zuffa, known as UFC, that heavily
favored the UFC with respect to most aspects of the contract.141 Fighter contracts
hold the championship belt for contracts of adhesion.142 Randy renounced his
affiliation with UFC and signed a new contract with a rival promotor HDNet
MMA. UFC filed suit and demanded that Randy’s contract term and the
subsequent violation of the contract be heard in arbitration. The Texas court
ruled that indeed the FAA required that the contract be submitted for arbitration
prior to any judicial action.143
The interesting part would have been if Randy were an employee and not
an independent contractor. As such, Randy could have filed an unfair labor
action with NLRB, and under the Board’s new line of reasoning, could have
invalidated the arbitration clause for not containing an NLRB disclaimer. Randy
would then have been able to file a judicial action free of the arbitration clause.
Let’s not forget DeMeco Ryans. Coverage by a collective bargaining
agreement would satisfy the NLRB “one bite of the apple” view. The NLRB
would not review the arbitration clause to deem it invalid because the NLRB
gives deference to the collective agreement.144 If the UFC and NFL contracts
both had the same arbitration clause it would be unenforceable for the UFC but
binding for the NFL? This paradox would change Section 7 of the NLRA to
protect a worker who “engages in concerted activities, for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, unless already
represented by a labor organization or collective bargaining agreement.” Of
course, that is not what it says. In the end the category of worker, represented or
non-represented, should mean less than ensuring equal treatment under the
NLRA.

140. Zuffa, LLC v. HDNet MMA 2008 LLC, 262 S.W.3d 446 (Tex. App. 2008).
141. Jonathan Snowden, The Business of Fighting: A Look Inside the UFC’s Top-Secret Fighter Contract,
BLEACHER REP. (May 14, 2013), https://bleacherrepo rt.com/articles/1516575-the-business-of-fighting-alook-inside-the-ufcs-top-secret-fighter-contract.
142. See Michael Conklin, Two Classifications Enter, One Classification Leaves: Are UFC Fighters
Employees or Independent Contractors?, 29 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J 227 (2020).
143. Zuffa, 262 S.W.3d at 451.
144. David Engstrom, Florence St. John and the Unfinished Fight for Fair Employment, STAN. LAW. MAG.
(Nov. 16, 2017), https://law.stanford.edu/stanford-lawyer/articles/florence-st-john-and-the-unfinished-fightfor-fair-employment/. A female autoworker named Florence St. John was being paid less than men operating
the same machinery in the same factory. The pay scales were established through collective bargaining and
the union refused to address the disparity or support her grievance. She banded together with two dozen other
women workers and filed a mutual action in federal court which was one of the first gender based “equal pay”
victories. Id.
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X. DO CONFIDENTIALITY CLAUSES VIOLATE THE NLRA?
Another creative route to invalidation involves discovery and settlement
confidentiality language in arbitration clauses. In Pfizer,145 an NLRB
administrative law judge devoted over 140 pages to express their disdain with
EPIC Systems Corporation and to create a new basis for rejection of mandatory
arbitration. The arbitration clause contained language of individualized
arbitration, plus an agreement to keep discovery information and the settlement
confidential. The confidentiality clause excluded information specifically
spelled out in Section 7 of the NLRA, like wages, hours, employment
conditions, etc.146 The Judge concluded that an employee cannot prospectively
grant confidentiality and that confidentiality of settlements violates Section 7 of
the NLRA. A Section 7 violation is immediately a Section 8 “unfair workplace”
violation and void with respect to the NLRA.
The Judge ruled that workers have a statutory right to provide and “know
of” settlements between similarly situated employees and the employer.147
Yikes. The Judge believes that individual settlements are terms and conditions
of employment, and as such the “activity” of sharing the information is covered
substantively under Section 7. Even the Department of Labor general counsel
advised148 the judge that “Confidentiality provisions that confine themselves to
information concerning matters disclosed in the arbitration hearing and relating
to the arbitration do not significantly implicate Section 7 rights, and therefore,
in conformity with Epic, such agreements should be enforced as written.”149
The Judge exercised powers that the Judge believed were conveyed to the
NLRB in section 10(a) of the NLRA.150 Section 10(a) provides that the Board is
empowered to prevent unfair labor practices and that power shall not be affected
by any other means of adjustment or prevention established by law.151 The
interpretation is that the FAA cannot interfere with the Boards power to declare
labor practices unfair.152 That is correct, but the Board cannot declare anything
it dislikes as an unfair labor practice. Time will tell if this avenue of arbitration
invalidation gains traction.153
From a professional sports law perspective, this is a crucial development.
Many of the disputes that arise between employers and players involve sensitive
145. Pfizer, Inc., 2019 NLRB LEXIS 199 (N.L.R.B. Mar. 21, 2019).
146. Id. at 5.
147. See id. at 123–124.
148. Id. at 33–34.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 33.
151. Id. at 32.
152. Id.
153. Cal. Commerce Club, Inc. & William J. Sauk., 2020 NLRB LEXIS 320 (N.L.R.B. Jun. 19, 2020)
(determining that a confidentiality requirement in an arbitration clause was not invalid due to Section 7 of the
NLRA).
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details that the parties wish to keep secret. Owners and players are managing
more than workplace behavior, they are managing the marketing and brand
images of the league, team, and individual athletic personas. Publication of the
gory details of the issues and the ultimate settlement could cost either side
millions of dollars in future earnings from tickets, sponsors and endorsements.
Athletes like Tiger Woods, Lance Armstrong, Maria Sharapova, Michael Vick,
and Jason Giambi have lost large amounts revenue from personal endorsement
deals due to personal tribulations made public. We can bet they would have
preferred that those incidents were kept private.
Another example involves the collusion grievance and settlement between
the NFL, Colin Kaepernick, and Eric Reid. The details of this settlement were
not publicly disclosed as per a confidentiality agreement between the parties.
Fellow union members do not know the details of the settlement, but as
mentioned earlier, the NLRB will not view that as a Section 7 violation. They
will view a prospective agreement to confidentiality of discovery and settlement
by a non-represented employee as a violation.
CONCLUSION
After ninety-five years of FAA protection, arbitration is not well received
by the judiciary or the NLRB. The Court has, like the Amphilogiai of ancient
Greece, engaged in endless debate regarding the merits and legality of
arbitration. The antagonists of this Vince McMahon154 performance script
repetitively denigrate the arbitration process and arbitrators. Their preference
would be for all employment contracts to be open for judicial interpretation and
revocation, except for collectively bargained agreements. Apparently, those
employees are stuck with whatever dispute resolution process the agreement
calls for.
The protagonists are not wholly sold on arbitration either. They
begrudgingly accept bi-lateral arbitration as enforceable, but balk at cost
effective multi-party arbitration. In Lamps Plus, Inc.155 the Court described class
arbitrations as so far removed from the ordinary understanding of bilateral
arbitration that parties must expressly authorize their use. The Court further
suggested that “[c]ourts may not infer from ambiguous agreement that parties
154. See Richard Hoy-Browne, Historic Moments in Wrestling Part 6: Vince McMahon Admits Wrestling
is Predetermined, INDEP. (May 30, 2014), https://www.independent.co.uk/sport/general/wwe-mmawrestling/historic-moments-wrestling-part-6-vince-mcmahon-admits-wrestling-predetermined9461429.html. Vince McMahon is the Chief Executive Officer of World Wrestling Entertainment (WWE).
McMahon was one of the first to admit that the matches were predetermined according to performance scripts
for each wrestler. These scripts would involve performers winning, losing, making and breaking alliances.
Performers would routinely move between heroic and villainous personifications of their characters.
McMahon also started the XFL. Id.
155. Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407 (2019).
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have consented to arbitrate on a classwide basis.”156 Ironically, arbitration of
multi-party claims157 is at the heart of the collectively bargained dispute
resolution process. It is not some novel, untested form of adjudication.
The reluctance of the courts and NLRB to accept employment arbitration
falls on five issues. The first is that the FAA requires the court to give deference
to the arbiter’s findings and the arbitration outcome. The second is that
arbitration is limited in scope by contract and is not amenable to novel legal
theories. The third is that attorneys are not going to get rich pursuing individual
arbitration claims. The negotiating position of individual claimants in
settlements is weak when compared to class groups resulting in lower
settlements and contingency fees. The fourth is that there is a divergence in the
characterization of, and rights associated with collectively bargained versus
individual employment contracts. And fifth, that an arbitration award forecloses
subsequent action.
For the sports world, employment contracts either collectively or
individually bargained, contain arbitration as the principle means of dispute
resolution. This has opened avenues of contract interpretation, like salary and
discipline, that would be woefully underserved in a judicial setting. Specifically,
salary and discipline are time sensitive to the athlete due to the limited window
for performance. The confidentiality of arbitration benefits athletes and owners
alike as public opinion directly impacts endorsements and ticket sales. Sensitive
issues like substance abuse, settlements, and injuries are best left to the
management of the parties and not outside interests, like the media. Even with
these benefits, the animus towards arbitration continues and sadly EPIC Systems
Corporation does not resolve these underlying conflicts, the war rages on.

156. Id. at 1419.
157. Brief for National Academy of Arbitrators as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, EPIC Sys. Corp.
v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018) (2017 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2838) (describing the ability of arbitration
to handle class or collective arbitrations dealing with substantive law and contractual issues).

